Age Discrimination in Employment and the Permissibility of Occupation Age Restrictions by Rosenblum, Marc
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 32 | Issue 5 Article 8
1-1981
Age Discrimination in Employment and the
Permissibility of Occupation Age Restrictions
Marc Rosenblum
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Marc Rosenblum, Age Discrimination in Employment and the Permissibility of Occupation Age Restrictions, 32 Hastings L.J. 1261
(1981).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol32/iss5/8
Age Discrimination in
Employment and the
Permissibility of Occupational
Age Restrictions
By M RC ROSENBLUM*
Prior to the passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act Amendments of 1978' (Amendments) a substantial number of
age discrimination complaints were dismissed because of procedu-
ral deficiencies. The high dismissal rate, estimated at up to one
half of all private suits, 2 led several commentators to conclude that
the narrow judicial interpretation of Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Acts (Act or ADEA) procedures was inconsistent with
and contrary to the remedial nature of the Act.4
The 1978 Amendments contain both procedural and substan-
tive provisions. The substantive provisions alter the scope of the
Act's coverage, modifying the age requirement and the types of
employment covered by the Act.5 The procedural provisions affect
* Chief Economist, United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. A.B.,
1963, City University of New York; M.A., 1964, City University of New York; Ph.D., 1972,
University of Minnesota. This Article represents the views of the author and does not neces-
sarily represent the official policy or position of the EEOC.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976)).
2. See Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HAnv. L. Rv.
380, 381 n.10 (1976).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
4. See S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEws 504, 515-16. See generally Note, Age Discrimination in Employment:
Available Federal Relief, 11 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 281, 286-304 (1975); Note, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 Hnv. L., REv. 380, 381 n.10 (1976).
5. The substantive amendments are as follows: (1) Involuntary retirement of persons
below age 70 is prohibited under the terms of any seniority system or employee benefit plan.
29 U.S.C. §§ 623(f)(2), 631(a) (Supp. 11 1979). A limited exception to this provision covered
certain collective bargaining agreements in effect on September 1, 1977. This exception ex-
pired on January 1, 1980. (2) Statutory coverage is extended to persons between the ages of
40 and 70, rather than to persons below age 65. Id. § 631(a). Several exceptions to this
change in age limits are included. Compulsory retirement of persons who, for the two-year
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litigation under the Act,' and are potentially important in two
period immediately preceding retirement, held positions as key business executives or
policymakers is permitted at age 65 where such persons are entitled to a pension of at least
$27,000 per year. Id. § 631(c)(1). Tenured faculty at colleges and universities are not covered
beyond age 65 until July 1, 1982. Id. § 631(d) (repealing provision set forth in Pub. L. No.
95-256, § 3(b)(3), 92 Stat. 189, 190 (1978)). (3) Federal government employees are covered at
age 40 with no upper age limit. Id. §§ 631(b), 633a(a). Previously, such employees were
subject to retirement at age 70. Id. § 633a(a)(1976). Thus, within the limits described above,
§ 4 of the ADEA, id. § 623(a)-(e), defines unlawful practices covering employers, employ-
ment agencies, labor organizations, retaliation against complaints by any or all of the afore-
mentioned groups, and advertisements specifying preferences or limits based on age.
Section 4(f) also includes a provision defining the Act's exemptions: "It shall not be
unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization-(1) to take any action
otherwise prohibited under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section where age is a bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particu-
lar business, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age; (2)
to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit plan
such as retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the pur-
poses of this chapter, except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to
hire any individual, and no such seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or
permit the involuntary retirement of any individual specified by section 631(a) of this title
because of the age of such individual; or (3) to discharge or otherwise discipline an individ-
ual for good cause." Id. § 623(f), as amended by Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189.
Subsections 4(f)(1), (3) were left intact while subsection 4(f)(2) was amended, as noted
under the first substantive provision listed above. Section 4(f)(1) was not amended, follow-
ing an agreement by the Senate to drop its proposed change, which would have made it
lawful to impose mandatory retirement on an employee at an age less than 65 where the
employer demonstrates that age is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), when
members of the House Conference Committee failed to approve such an amendment. The
Conference Report states: "The conferees agree that the amendment neither added to nor
worked any change upon present law." See H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1978),
reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 528-29.
Under the Senate proposal to amend § 4(f)(1), the subsection would have read as fol-
lows: "It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organiza-
tion-(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this
section, including the establishment of a mandatory retirement age less than the maximum
age specified in section 12 of this Act, where age is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business, or where the differ-
entiation is based on reasonable factors other than age ... " S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 24 (1977).
In explaining the principal provisions of its version, the Senate Report, discussing
§ 4(f)(1), stated: "The committee intends to make clear that under this legislation an em-
ployer would not be required to retain anyone who is not qualified to perform a particular
job. For example, in certain types of particularly arduous law enforcement activity, there
may be a factual basis for believing that substantially all employees above a specified age
would be unable to continue to perform safely and efficiently the duties of their particular
jobs, and it may be impossible or impractical to determine through medical examinations,
periodic reviews of current job performance and other objective tests the employees' capa-
city or ability to continue to perform the jobs safely and efficiently.
"Accordingly, the committee adopted an amendment to make it clear that where these
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ways: first, to the extent that experience influences peers, fewer
older workers will regard as futile legal action against employment
discrimination if they see others prevailing in such actions; second,
more employers will be forced to consider the consequences of and
the potential liability for their employment practices if complaints
lead to substantive litigation.
Although the impact of the Amendments' has been minimal in
terms of increasing the percentage of older workers in the work
force,8 extrinsic factors, such as voluntary retirement and with-
drawal from the work force because of illness and disability, oper-
two conditions are satisfied and where such a bona fide occupational qualification has there-
fore been established, an employer may lawfully require mandatory retirement at that speci-
fied age. The committee also expressed its concern that litigation should not be the sole
means of determining the validity of a bona fide occupational qualification. Although the
Secretary is presently empowered to issue advisory opinions on the applicability of BFOQ
exception. [sic] The committee recommended that the Secretary examine the feasibility of
issuing guidelines to aid employers in determining the applicability of section 4(f1(1) to
their particular situations." Id. at 10-11.
Commenting on the Senate's proposed amendment of § 4(f)(1), Senator Javits indicated
that the "clarifying language was approved which permits the establishment of a designated
retirement age less than age 70 where age has been shown to be an important indicator of
job performance." Id. at 32.
Although the Senate's proposed amendment to § 4(f1(1) was deleted by the Conference
Committee, it is nonetheless pertinent because a determination of which employer practices
are specifically permitted under § 4(f)(1) is fundamental to current and future interpreta-
tion of the statute.
The scope of § 4(f)(1) has not yet been fully clarified by the federal courts of appeals.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has declined to review the BFOQ question when it was
raised by litigating parties. See, e.g., Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 581
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, 499 F.2d 859 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
6. The Amendments changed the Act's procedural provisions in a number of areas: (1)
a jury trial is now authorized on any issue of fact, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (Supp. 1 1979); (2) a
complainant, rather than filing a notice to sue, now files a charge alleging unlawful discrimi-
nation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)
(Supp. 1I 1978) (enforcement of this section of the ADEA was transferred from the Secre-
tary of Labor to the EEOC effective Jan. 1, 1979. Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321
(1978 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app., at 354 (Supp. 11 1979) and in 92 Stat. 3781
(1978)); (3) the statute of limitations is now tolled for up to one year while the EEOC at-
tempts conciliation. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (Supp. 11 1979). Previously, the lawsuit had to be
initiated within two years of the alleged discriminatory act.
7. The Act's overall present impact, and the extent to which age discrimination in
employment has lessened as a result, is beyond the scope of this Article. Such a review
would require a comparison of all persons whose employment experience under statutory
protection differed from what it otherwise would have been, and the development of some
means of distinguishing such an impact on a section by section basis.
8. See Rones, The Retirement Decision: A Question of Opportunity? MoNTHLY LAB.
Rzv., Nov., 1980, at 14.
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ate to make such a measurement an unreliable indication of the
impact of the Amendments.9 The influence on the decisionmaking
processes of ADEA-protected workers and ADEA-covered employ-
ers resulting from the Amendments suggests that the Amendments
have had at least some impact on the job status of incumbent older
workers.10
This Article reviews the problem of age discrimination in em-
ployment, particularly the effectiveness of the ADEA in reducing
the incidence of age discrimination. The Article first analyzes the
major statutory exceptions to the ADEA, emphasizing judicial in-
terpretation of the bona fide occupational qualification with refer-
ence to police, firefighters, and airline pilots. The Article next dis-
cusses the standard of review for age discrimination claims brought
under the federal constitution that, in conjunction with the ADEA,
provide the framework of permissible employment practices affect-
ing older workers on the basis of age. The Article concludes that
the dual statutory and constitutional protection afforded to indi-
viduals claiming age discrimination is largely illusory because of
the scope of the exemptions under the ADEA and the lenient stan-
dard of judicial review accorded to age-based classifications under
equal protection analysis.
Statutory Exemptions under Section 4(f)
Section 4(f) of the Act sets forth exemptions to the provisions
9. This is true particularly among those 65 years and older, whose labor force partici-
pation declined from 16.0% in 1975 to 15.2% in 1979. The Department of Labor projects
the acceleration of this trend, reflecting declines in absolute numbers as well as in the pro-
portion of workers age 65 and older in the labor force, to 10.3% in 1985 and 9.3% in 1990 in
an intermediate growth scenario, and to 7.9% and 6.4%, respectively, in a low growth scena-
rio. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, Tables E-1,
E-2 (1980); 28 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT & EARNINGS, Table
3 (Jan., 1981).
10. This impact, however, will not be of equal benefit to all ADEA-protected workers.
The emphasis of the Amendments is on the retention and delayed retirement of currently
employed workers. Older workers seeking employment gain little substantive protection
from the Amendments.
It is difficult to measure the effect of changed retirement age limits apart from other
factors, especially prospective sources and levels of retirement income, that influence volun-
tary retirement decisions. Nonetheless, a recent report issued by the Urban Institute in
Washington, D.C. estimated that, by the mid-1980's, 335,000 more workers aged 62-69 will
remain in the labor force than would have done so in the absence of the Amendments.
Wertheimer & Zedlewski, THE DIRECT EFFECTS OF MANDATORY RETIREMENT AGE LIMITS ON
OLDER WORKERS (1980).
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of the ADEA. 11 The exemptions allow an employer to take other-
wise prohibited action when age is a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation (BFOQ), 12 when the action is based on reasonable factors
other than age .(RFOA),'s or for good cause. "
The Good Cause Defense
Although section 4(f)(3) of the ADEA permits discharge or
discipline for good cause, until recently relatively few cases have
attempted to provide a definition of "good cause." 5 One recent ap-
pellate decision, however, suggests that the "good cause" defense
may be increasingly used in age discrimination litigation because
of the vagueness of the standards for good cause. In Harpring v.
Continental Oil Co.,"6 the Fifth Circuit modified the McDonnell
Douglas" test on the order and burden of proof in age discrimina-
11. See note 5 supra.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1976), as amended by Age Discrimination in Employment
Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189.
13. Id.
14. Id. § 623(f)(3).
15. See, e.g., Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1008 (1st Cir. 1979) (involuntary
termination, poor performance, subsection not cited); Cova v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 574
F.2d 958 (8th Cir. 1978) (reasons for affirming trial court detailed, subsection cited but not
defined); Marshall v. Roberts Dairy Co., 572 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1978) (medical reasons,
ineffectiveness); Anderson v. Viking Pump Div., Houdaille Indus., Inc., 545 F.2d 1127 (8th
Cir. 1976) (poor prior performance); Brennan v. Reynolds & Co., 367 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. I.
1973) (excessive tardiness). Cf. Johnston v. Marion Independent School Dist., 275 N.W.2d
215 (Iowa 1979) (good cause must relate to some specific personal fault, not merely a per-
son's age, under similar section of state statute).
16. 628 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1980).
17. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Court held that a
prima facie case of racial discrimination is made by a showing that the plaintiff (1) belongs
to a group protected by the statute, (2) applied and was qualified for a job the employer was
seeking to fill, (3) was not hired, and (4) the employer continued to seek applicants with
similar qualifications. Id. at 802. In age discrimination cases, this has been interpreted to
require a showing that the plaintiff (1) belongs to the statutorily protected age group, (2)
was qualified for his or her position, (3) was discharged by the employer, and (4) was re-
placed by someone not in the protected group. Price v. Maryland Cas. Co., 561 F.2d 609, 612
(5th Cir. 1977); Oson v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 480 F. Supp. 773, 779 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
But see Sahadi v. Reynolds Chem., 636 F.2d 1116 (6th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). The court in
Sahadi did not require the fourth element of proof, holding that a prima facie case was not
established by a showing of discharge and replacement by a younger worker (albeit one also
in the protected class) where the economic factor of retrenchment during a recession was
stated "good cause." This may be interpreted as good cause although § 4(f)(3) was not spe-
cifically invoked. The court reasoned that a finding for the plaintiff would mean that every
terminated employee above age 40 would then be able to establish a prima facie case and
create a burden of rebuttal on the employer. Id. at 1118.
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tion cases, holding that "[o]nce the prima facie case is made out,
the employer then has the burden to produce evidence tending to
show that the employee was discharged for a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason such as good cause." '
In a Title VII case, the Supreme Court recently clarified the
nature and extent of the employer's burden. The employer must
"articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the em-
ployee's rejection." 19 This burden, however, is one of production
rather than of persuasion; the burden of persuasion remains on the
plaintiff.20 In Harpring, the court noted that "[t]he employer does
not have to show the legitimate reason for the discharge by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, rather he merely has to come forward
with relevant evidence to satisfy his burden of production."2' 1 An
employer thus may meet its burden merely by showing that the
employee was discharged for good cause.2
As indicated in Harpring, moreover, an employee's prima facie
case is easily rebutted, though the employee still has an opportu-
nity to show that the employer's rebuttal is pretextual. This oppor-
tunity is slight, however, because most individual terminations for
cause are based on subjective assessments of performance ade-
quacy.2 ' Thus, the use of the "good cause" defense under section
4(f)(3) is likely to increase as its broad nature and its compatibility
with the burden of proof become better understood.
The BFOQ Defense
Employers have principally relied upon the defenses set out in
section 4(f) (1)24 to defend alleged discriminatory practices. Of the
two defenses within that section, the BFOQ defense is more popu-
lar than the RFOA defense. This preference is due in part to the
judicial application of BFOQ standards under Title VII of the Civil
18. 628 F.2d at 408.
19. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978) (quoting McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). See Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439
U.S. 24, 25 n.2 (1978).
20. E.g., Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978). See Furnco Constr. Corp.
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576-78 (1978).
21. 628 F.2d at 408-09.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 407. "The witnesses for Conoco testified that Harpring's age had nothing
to do with Conoco's dissatisfaction and ultimate discharge of Harpring." Id.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1976). For the full text of this section, see note 5 supra.
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Rights Act25 to age discrimination cases.2"
The BFOQ defense also is preferred because it allows the em-
ployer to set a specific age limit and to exclude all persons beyond
that age even though some of those persons might otherwise be
able to demonstrate an ability to perform the jobs in question.
An age-related BFOQ permits an employer to admit that he has
discriminated on the basis of age, but to avoid any penalty. Es-
tablishment of a BFOQ relating to age justifies an employer's vio-
lation of the heart of the ADEA, allowing him to apply a general
exclusionary rule to otherwise statutorily protected individuals
solely on the basis of class membership. The good cause and dif-
ferentiating factor exemptions, on the other hand, are denials of
the plaintiff's prima facie case. 27
To establish the BFOQ defense, the employer must show that
its use of an age limit otherwise unlawful under the statute is
based on a reasonable and factual belief that all or substantially all
of the persons in that type of work would be unable to perform the
job safely and efficiently after a certain age, and that the essence of
the business would be undermined without this age limit.2 8 If the
employer cannot meet this burden, it may justify its use of an age
limit otherwise unlawful under the statute by demonstrating that
it is "impossible or highly impractical" to measure and predict job
performance for each individual.29
The RFOA Defense
While the BFOQ defense is an affirmative defense, the RFOA
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
26. See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing Weeks
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) and Diaz v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971)).
27. Marshall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 591 (5th Cir. 1978).
28. See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1976).
29. Id. at 235 (quoting Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 n.5
(5th Cir. 1969)). The Usery court applied these standards, thereby augmenting the test ar-
ticulated in Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975), that there be a "rational basis in fact to believe... [that there
was an] increase [in] the likelihood of risk of harm from continued employment of the indi-
vidual." Under such a test the employer "need only demonstrate... a minimal increase in
risk of harm." Id. i
In reaching its conclusion that public safety was an important factor in determining
that the bus driver hiring age was a BFOQ, the court of appeals in Greyhound relied upon
Spurlock v. United Air Lines, 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972), in which United's requirement
for employment as a flight officer was upheld as a BFOQ despite adverse impact against
blacks as a class. 499 F.2d at 863.
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defense is an employer's rebuttal to an employee's proof that age
influenced an employment decision. The RFOA defense has been
asserted successfully when adverse economic conditions affected an
entire company and when company reorganization required reas-
signing personnel. 80 Moreover, employers have successfully as-
serted RFOA defenses when they terminated older employees who
failed to meet assigned, objectively measured levels of performance
or economic output.31
Combining Defenses
The RFOA defense and the good cause defense have been
combined in several cases. 2 This combination suggests that when
factors other than age affect an individual employee's status, the
RFOA defense is in itself a sufficient explanation. Consequently,
the RFOA defense is both bolstered and augmented by good cause
when an older employee, discharged because of unsatisfactory per-
formance, raises allegations of illegal treatment beyond the
RFOA.33 In some instances, reasonable factors other than age verge
on or merge with good cause.3 4 Either way, the employer is denying
the allegation of impermissible discriminatory practices.
If the employer satisfies the explanatory burden of the RFOA
or good cause defenses, the employee still has an opportunity to
persuade the court that the employer's stated reasons are actually
30. See, e.g., Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975); Gill v. Union
Carbide Corp., 368 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
31. See Surrisi v. Conwed Corp., 510 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1975) (sales manager failed to
increase sales); Price v. Maryland Cas. Co., 391 F. Supp. 613 (S.D. Miss. 1975), af'd, 561
F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1977) (sales level of insurance sold too low); Usery v. General Elec. Co., 13.
F.E.P. Cas. 1641 (M.D. Tenn. 1976) (plant manager failed to solve problems and cooperate
with superiors).
32. See, e.g., Surrisi v. Conwed Corp., 510 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1975); Price v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 391 F. Supp. 613 (S.D. Miss. 1975), afl'd, 561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1977); Usery v.
General Elec. Co., 13 F.E.P. Cas. 1641 (M.D. Tenn. 1976).
33. The interchangeability of the RFOA and good cause defenses in such situations is
illustrated in Price v.-Maryland Cas. Co., 391 F. Supp. 613 (S.D. Miss. 1975), aff'd, 561 F.2d
609 (5th Cir. 1977), where the trial court cited § 4(f)(3) and discussed good cause, while the
court of appeals referred to the same section but based its ruling on the RFOA defense.
34. See, e.g., Schwager v. Sun Oil Co., 591 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1979) (general reorganiza-
tion of company, poor economic conditions, poorest sales record in district); Buchholz v.
Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706, 711-12 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (defendant's claim of RFOA
and good cause shown to be pretext, judgment for plaintiff); Magruder v. Selling Areas Mar-
keting, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1155, 1164 (N.D. MI1. 1977) (unacceptable job performance after
demotion).
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a pretext for discrimination.15 The employee's opportunity to rebut
the employer's defense reflects a recognition that the RFOA de-
fense permits employers to portray a wide range of practices as
"reasonable" which may not be reasonable."6
The merging of the RFOA and good cause defenses must be
distinguished, however, from employers' attempts to advance si-
multaneously both RFOA and BFOQ exceptions under section
4(f)(1). This combination of an affirmative defense and a denial is
rarely asserted. As the district court commented in Marshall v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,s7 "[a] defense based on age will not
entitle the defendant to claim an exception under 4(f)(1) for dif-
ferentiation based on reasonable factors other than age. The de-
fendant has intermixed its RFOA and BFOQ defenses." s
Police Officer, Firefighter, and Airline Pilot Cases
ADEA litigation involving age as a BFOQ in both hiring and
mandatory retirement has focused primarily on three occupations:
police officers, firefighters, and airline pilots. In all three occupa-
tions, the limits imposed for hiring generally fall below the ADEA
lower limit of age forty.39 Mandatory retirement specifications vary
for police officers and firefighters, 0 while commercial airline pilots
are forced to vacate the cockpit by the Federal Aviation Agency
(FAA) "Age 60 Rule.""1 Recent and pending24 cases involving these
35. See, e.g., Havelick v. Julius Wile Sons & Co., 445 F. Supp. 919, 926 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (plaintiff failed to show good cause termination to be pretext); Coates v. National
Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 661 (W.D. Va. 1977) (lack of training as implied RFOA
for termination determined to be pretext, as defendant discriminatorily precluded older em-
ployees from receiving training).
36. See,.e.g., Cannistra v. FAA, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. 30,143 (D.D.C. 1979), where the
court found the "reasonable" practice of transferring older employees to be a subterfuge for
violating § 4(a).
37. 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8973 (W.D. Tenn. 1979).
38. Id. at 6049 (emphasis in original).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. 11 1979).
40. Complete data on the age limits of state and local government employees is not
available, but recent studies indicate compulsory retirement for police generally ranges be-
tween 50 and 55 years of age. Hiring limits are as low 'as 32, not generally above 40, and
average about 34. FLYm & SI.VR, POLICE SELECrION MAmMUM AGE STANDmADS: A REVIEw
(1980).
41. 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1980).
42. A number of recent actions involving police and firefighters were resolved prior to
trial. E.g., EEOC v. City of Virginia Beach, No. 79-557 (E.D. Va. 1980) (consent decree
entered) (police hiring); EEOC v. County of Alameda, No. 79-1230 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (consent
OCCUPATIONAL AGE RETRICTIONSMay 1981]
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occupations could determine whether the BFOQ exception and
mandatory retirement ages will remain in widespread use.
A few decisions distinguish the rigors of actual firefighting
from the responsibilities of supervising the work of other persons.
In Aaron v. Davis,43 a district fire chief and his assistant success-
fully challenged mandatory retirement at age sixty-two despite the
defense's argument of "risk of harm to the public or to other
firemen."'44 Similarly, in EEOC v. City of St. Paul,45 an age sixty-
five BFOQ was upheld for firefighters and captains, but not for fire
chiefs. The St. Paul court stated:
[S]usceptibility to heart attack and possession of the muscle
strength and endurance required by District Chiefs may be ascer-
tained with greater accuracy by individual testing.... [T]he en-
durance required of Captains and Firefighters-who must per-
form strenuous tasks for several hours near extreme heat-cannot
be satisfactorily determined by individual testing. For Captains
and Firefighters it is reasonably necessary to rely on age as an
indicator of inability to perform adequately.46
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in EEOC v. City of Janesville47
ruled that an age fifty-five retirement limit could be applied to all
police officers, including the chief. The decision in Janesville
rested on statutory construction of the language in section 4(0(1)
that provides: "age is a bona fide occupational qualification reason-
ably necessary to the normal operation of the particular busi-
ness. '48 The court defined the particular business involved as the
entire police department, not as just the occupation of chief. Thus,
the court did not reach the issue of whether retirement at age fifty-
decree entered) (police hiring); EEOC v. City of New Bern, No. 79-0021-4 (E.D. N.C. 1980)
(consent decree entered) (police hiring); EEOC v. City of Middletown, No. 1-78-28 (S.D.
Ohio 1981) (consent decree entered) (police hiring); EEOC v. City of Youngstown, No. 79-
745-Y (N.D. Ohio 1981) (consent decree entered) (police hiring); EEOC v. City of Ventura,
No. 79-3086-MML (C.D. Cal. 1980) (consent decree entered) (police hiring). When settle-
ments were not reached, several local governments were enjoined from involuntarily retiring
their fire chiefs pending final resolution of those cases. See EEOC v. City of Ft. Smith, No.
80-2158 (W.D. Ark. 1980) (temporary restraining order entered); EEOC v. City of Ecorse,
No. 80-73383 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (temporary restraining order entered); EEOC v. City of
Allen Park, No. 79-72986 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (temporary restraining order entered).
43. 414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
44. Id. at 461.
45. 500 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Minn. 1980).
46. Id. at 1146.
47. 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'g 480 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. Wisc. 1979).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
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five is more or less rational for a chief than for subordinates. 49 The
Seventh Circuit's broad definition of the "particular business" in-
volved in Janesville seems to thwart the ADEA's remedial pur-
poses; by defining "business" in the aggregate, discrimination
against specific classes of workers may be masked.
Another important aspect of the Janesville decision is the fac-
tual basis of the claimed exemption under section 4(f)(1). In
Janesville, the City relied on the Wisconsin statute governing re-
tirement of protective workers.5 In relying on the state statute,
the City deferred to a valid legislative act; however, it failed to
consider any empirical findings on the relationship between age
and the job performance of police chiefs in Wisconsin.51
Few other reported cases shed light on the proper standards to
be applied in determining the validity of a BFOQ defense. In Ar-
ritt v. Grisell,52 the trial court granted summary judgment uphold-
ing an age thirty-five hiring limit on the basis of the police chief's
affidavit that the job required "driving at high speeds, shooting
weapons with great accuracy, [and] apprehension of criminals by
force." ' The Fourth Circuit reversed in order to provide the plain-
tiffs with an opportunity to rebut the affidavit and introduce their
own evidence.54 Similarly, in Beck v. Borough of Manheim the
Court emphasized the need for stamina, the use of force, and the
absence of backup officers in emergencies as justifying an age sixty
BFOQ; thus, mandatory retirement at sixty for police officers was
upheld.5 In Rodriguez v. Taylor,6 the City of Philadelphia had
refused to permit a forty-one year old candidate to apply for a po-
49. The court distinguished the case from its ruling in Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975), noting that there "a
BFOQ defense was asserted to justify the mandatory age-based retirement of a generic class
of employees," but was not applied to the entire business. 630 F.2d at 1258.
In Hodgson, the carrier met the burden of proving that elimination of a maximum hir-
ing age of 35 for bus drivers would increase the likelihood of harm to passengers.
50. The statute involved was the Wisconsin Public Employees Retirement Act, Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 66.906 (1965), permitting the forced retirement of protective service employees
at age 55. Id. at 1258.
51. In that sense, Janesville is a direct descendant of Massachusetts Bd. of Retire-
ment v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam), which upheld a state law requiring uni-
formed police officers to retire at age 50.
52. 421 F. Supp. 800 (N.D. W. Va. 1976).
53. Id. at 802.
54. 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977).
55. 505 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
56. 428 F. Supp. 1118 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd in relevant part, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, Taylor v. Rodriguez, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
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sition as a museum guard. Because the City failed to establish that
age forty was a BFOQ for such positions, it was found to have vio-
lated the ADEA. 7
The occupation of airline pilot also has been the subject of
litigation involving the validity of age as a BFOQ. The BFOQ ex-
emption is based on the factual premise that determining fitness
on an individual basis is impossible or impractical. The principal
dispute thus centers on: (1) the degree to which recent advance-
ments in medical science make it possible to predict accurately the
occurrence of disabling conditions that incapacitate pilots in flight;
and (2) whether a pilot beyond age sixty can safely and efficiently
perform his or her job.
More than twenty years ago, the FAA determined that reliable
individual testing was not feasible for commercial airlines. 59 Re-
cently, Congress held extensive hearings and ordered a review of
the continued propriety of the "Age 60 Rule" by the National In-
stitutes of Health. °0 The study, conducted for the National Insti-
tutes of Health by the Institute of Medicine of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences, concluded that although some increased risk of
cardiovascular failure or stroke was associated with age, there was
no evidence to identify age sixty as a medically prudent retirement
age.' Although considerable support for modifying the age limit
has been demonstrated, a proposed amendment of this rule was
narrowly defeated in Congress before this study was conducted.2
Advances in both medical science and the technology of flight
simulation equipment now make it possible to test individually the
performance ability of all airline pilot applicants. Thus, it is possi-
ble to measure and predict job performance for each individual.6 3
It may be impracticable to do so, however, when'the cost of screen-
57. 428 F. Supp. at 1120-21.
58. See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1976). Ac-
cord, Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
966 (1977).
59. 24 Fed. Reg. 9767 (1959).
60. Mandatory Age Retirement-Pilots, Pub. L. No. 96-171, 93 Stat. 1285 (1979).
61. Airline Pilot Age, Health and Performance: Scientific and Medical Considerations,
Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences (1981).
62. See H.R. REP. No. 474, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
63. The court in Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976), set
out the elements for a BFOQ defense, including a showing that it is "impossible or highly
impractical" to measure and predict job performance for each individual. See notes 28-29 &
accompanying text supra.
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ing applicants is balanced against public safety requirements." If
the ADEA's remedial purpose is not to be frustrated by setting
questionable age limits on the basis of unwarranted generaliza-
tions, then a closer relationship between contemporary evidence
and the granting of BFOQ exemptions must be required.6 5
Establishment of a maximum hiring age for airplane pilots in-
volves similar issues. The principal reported case, Murnane v.
American Airlines, Inc.,e" relies heavily on the "Age 60 Rule." The
Murnane court held that safety precluded the hiring of a forty-
three year old pilot because he would almost have reached the
mandatory retirement age before he would have become a cap-
tain.7 The court accepted the defendant's argument that a pilot's
related skills and experience as, for example, a military flier, are
nontransferable; thus, pilots not trained by American Airlines
could not shorten the promotion period by receiving credit for pre-
vious' experience. "While such experience has some minimal value,
the best experience an American Captain can have is flying for
American Airlines.
6 8 t
The court's finding of nontransferability of skills could be jus-
tified on the basis of the unique safety concerns essential to air
transportation. Nontransferability of skills as a general proposi-
tion, however, could exclude many persons from employment. It
would allow employers to circumvent the purposes of the Act by
claiming BFOQ exemptions on the basis of unsupported and
stereotyped assertions."9
64. See generally Note, The Cost of Growing Old: Business Necessity and the Age
Discrimination Act, 88 YALE L.J. 565 (1979).
65. Related to the "Age 60 Rule" limitation on pilots is the practice of pilots ap-
proaching age sixty to "downbid" and become flight engineers. Flight engineers are not re-
quired by the FAA to relinquish their jobs at age sixty as they do not actually fly the air-
plane. See 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1980). Consequently, because there is no "Age 60 Rule"
for flight engineers, employees in that classification may not be involuntarily retired under
terms of a benefit plan in accordance with section 4(f(2) of the ADEA. See Criswell v.
Western Air Lines, Inc., 21 Empl. Prac. Dec. 30,466 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
66. 482 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-1025 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
67. 482 F. Supp. at 144-45. Most major airlines have an "Age 30 Guideline," an infor-
mal upper limit beyond which most applicants for flight jobs are not hired. Insofar as the
ADEA does not encompass persons below age 40, rejecting applicants in that range solely
for age is permitted; a ruling against the pilot age BFOQ would, however, have the practical
effect of removing the "Guideline" completely.
68. 482 F. Supp. at 146.
69. While the second prong of the Weeks-Diaz test articulated in Tamiami requires
the BFOQ to be "reasonably necessary" to the "essence" of the business, see note 28 &
accompanying text supra, both the first and second prongs must be met to qualify for the
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Constitutional Challenges
In addition to bringing actions under the ADEA, individuals
claiming that they have been discriminated against on the basis of
age by a governmental employer may raise constitutional chal-
lenges to the governmental action. Thus, a second issue of signifi-
cant controversy is the appropriate standard of judicial review of
age discrimination claims raised under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Various standards of judicial review
have been applied in discrimination cases. Discrimination based on
race has been uniformly judged under a strict scrutiny standard"0
because minorities are deemed a "suspect class"-a group of per-
sons who are highly probable recipients of discriminatory treat-
ment.7 1 Although sex is not considered a suspect class, classifica-
tions based on sex have been subjected to more rigorous judicial
scrutiny than the rational basis test.7 2 Age discrimination, on the
other hand, has received only the less stringent review of the ra-
tional basis test.7 3
exception. The first prong-" a trait precluding safe and efficient job performance that can-
not be ascertained by means other than knowledge of the applicant's membership in the
class"--is at the core of the controversy. See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d
224, 235 (5th Cir. 1976). Advances in flight simulator technology over the past ten years
permit highly accurate determinations of pilot proficiency, so that any justification for a
claim under the first prong covering pilots appears to be lacking. In holding that Murnane
himself would not have been hired for reasons unrelated to age (lack of judgment, poor
performance on flight simulator), the court implicitly acknowledged that these technological
advances may be used to deny prospective pilots a position without depriving an entire class
of persons the opportunity to be considered for jobs. See 482 F. Supp. at 149-51.
70. Under a strict scrutiny analysis, a statutory classification will be upheld only if the
state demonstrates an "overriding statutory purpose," see McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 192 (1964), and the means used by the state to achieve its statutory goal are "precisely
drawn in light of the acknowledged purpose." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643
(1973).
71. See, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
72. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
73. E.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 311-14 (1976) (per
curiam). Under a rational basis test, a statute "will not be set aside if any set of facts rea-
sonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Murgia, urged that in cases of age discrimination in em-
ployment the party relying on a mandatory retirement statute as a defense be required to
show a "reasonably substantial interest and a scheme reasonably closely tailored to achiev-
ing that interest." 427 U.S. at 325 (Marshall, J., dissenting). This test is more rigorous than
the rational basis approach used by the Court in Murgia. See also L. TRIBE, AmERcAN CON-
sTrrTUONAL LAW 1077-82 (1978) (advocating use of an intermediate test in cases involving
age discrimination).
For a discussion of distinctions pertaining to age discrimination cases, see THE NEXT
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Exemplifying the attitude of those who distinguish age from
other classifications, the court in Cunningham v. Central Bever-
age, Inc.74 stated: "The discrimination suffered by the aged is dif-
ferent from that suffered by females or blacks. '7 5 Similarly, the
Supreme Court, finding that age does not constitute a suspect clas-
sification because all persons age 7 6 noted that "[s]uch persons...
have not. . been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of
stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. '7 7
The "replacement of an older employee by a younger worker [thus]
does not raise the same inference of improper motive that attends
replacement of a black by a white person in Title VII cases."7 8
The cases rejecting the argument that age is a suspect class
have failed to recognize that people age sequentially. One is pre-
sumed to be incapable of job performance once classified according
to the group characteristic. When age is the characteristic, rather
than the immutable characteristics of race or sex more readily ac-
corded judicial notice, the person is "subjected to unique disabili-
ties" only when he or she attains the specified age. At that time, it
is unimportant that earlier the person was not in the protected
class or subjected to bias.
Equal Protection
The constitutionality of mandatory retirement was initially
upheld in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia7 9 a case
involving state police. The Court concluded that the public inter-
est in police protection and safety outweighed the state's obliga-
tion to use some basis other than age for retiring persons.
Through mandatory retirement at age 50, the legislature seeks to
protect the public by assuring physical preparedness of its uni-
formed police. Since physical ability generally declines with age,
STEPS IN COMBATTING AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT:. WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
MANDATORY RETImENT POLICY, SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9
(1977) (report of M. Rosenblum).
74. 486 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
75. Id. at 62 (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312
(1976), and Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 1977)).
76. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976). See
also Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 1977).
77. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
78. Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d .730, 736 (5th Cir. 1977).
79. 427 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1976). The Supreme Court acknowledged that it had previ-
ous opportunities to address the same issues and that it had not done so. Id. at 308 n.1.
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mandatory retirement serves to remove from police service those
whose fitness for uniformed work presumptively has diminished
with age. This clearly is rationally related to the State's
objective....
That the State chooses not to determine fitness more pre-
cisely through individualized testing after age 50 is not to say that
the objective of assuring physical fitness is not rationally fur-
thered by a maximum-age limitation. It is only to say that with
regard to the interest of all concerned, the State perhaps has not
chosen the best means to accomplish this purpose. But where
rationality is the test, a State "does not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws
are imperfect.'' 80
The Court's analysis in Murgia reveals two problems. First, the ra-
tional basis standard tolerates "imperfect classifications" that
serve to shield admittedly discriminatory practices even when em-
pirical evidence reveals a more perfect classification. Inasmuch as
the rational basis standard is judicially created, imperfect classifi-
cations are perpetuated by the judicial process. Second, the ra-
tional basis standard may permit the court to reject challenges to
the BFOQ defense without requiring the defendant to put forth
evidence of the factual basis of the BFOQ defense. For example, in
Touhy v. Ford Motor Co.,81 a private action, the defendant was
granted summary judgment without a showing that its policy of
terminating company pilots at age sixty was based on something
more than an analogy to the FAA's "Age 60 Rule" for commercial
pilots.8 2 There was no evidence that it was "impossible or impracti-
cal" to deal with employees individually. Yet, because the FAA
"Age 60 Rule" is presumptively reasonable, the adoption of the
rule by the private employer was considered reasonable as well.83
Had the "Age 60 Rule" been subject to the strict scrutiny stan-
dard, the rule itself, and most likely the Touhy employer's age
sixty rule, would have had to overcome evidentiary challenges go-
ing to the predictability of pilot performance and the likelihood of
medical incapacitation at age sixty.
The Murgia doctrine, while arguably justified when the pub-
lic's physical safety is involved, has since been expanded to occu-
80. Id. at 314-16 (footnotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
81. 490 F. Supp. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-1572 (6th Cir. 1980).
82. 14 C.F.R. § 121,383(c) (1980).
83. Although not absolutely bound by the FAA rule, the court in Touhy relied largely
on an analogy to its provisions and their presumptive reasonableness. 490 F. Supp. at 264.
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pations not involving the public's physical safety. In Martin v.
Tamaki,s4 the court held that the Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power could retire its employees at age sixty-five be-
cause, in emergencies, younger personnel would better assure citi-
zens of an uninterrupted source of water and power. While such a
criterion may be rational for employees involved directly in the
production and distribution of power, it is not rational for white-
collar employees like Mr. Martin, a public relations representa-
tive.8 5 The rational basis standard, however, permits such dispari-
ties in classification without a detailed examination of their
justification.88
Other decisions also ignore the concerns for public safety that
influenced the Court's decision in Murgia.7 Indeed, these other
decisions make no occupational distinctions but instead focus on
the relationship of the challenged statutory classification to the
legislative objective. In Trafelet v. Thompson,8 8 mandatory retire-
ment of state judges at age seventy was held rationally justified on
three grounds: (1) the work of judges "makes unique and exacting
demands on faculties that age tends to erode"; (2) imposing a re-
quirement that results in allowing the appointment of new judges
on a regular basis assures excellence in the judiciary; and (3)
judges are subject to a special retention system making them ex-
84. 607 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1979).
85. Id. at 310. Cf. EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980) (upholding
mandatory retirement of all police officers at age 55). See notes 47-51 & accompanying text
supra.
86. Where legislative purposes conflict, enactments having discriminatory conse-
quences on older workers can result. Recent decisions urge employment opportunities for
younger workers as a valid reason for removing older ones. E.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S.
93, 101 (1979); Martin v. Tamaki, 607 F.2d 307, 310 (9th Cir. 1979). But see Gault v. Garri-
son, 569 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979) (holding that
mandatory retirement of public school teachers at age 65 was violative of equal protection
absent a showing of a rational basis for such classification). Justice Pell, in dissent, pro-
nounced that: "[Tihere is a growing surplus of teachers with the forecast that this surplus
will continue to grow in size with many recent graduates majoring in education being unable
to find employment." Id. at 1000. Similarly, a state court has upheld statutory termination
of the oldest employees who are eligible for pensions in order to ensure that as few others as
possible are left without income, specifically finding no conflict between state law and the
ADEA. Schultz v. Piro, 397 A.2d 484 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979).
87. See, e.g., Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906
(1979); Palmer v. Ticcione, 576 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979);
Johnson v. Lefkowitz, 566 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979); Talbot v.
Pyke, 533 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1976).
88. 594 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906 (1979).
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empt from opposition during elections.8 9 Similarly, in Vance v.
Bradley,90 the Supreme Court, relying on the presumed validity of
legislative acts, reversed the district court's holding that a statute
providing for mandatory retirement of foreign service officers at
age sixty served no rational purpose.9 ' The Court stated that
"'[tihe District Court's responsibility for making "findings of fact"
certainly does not authorize it to resolve conflicts in the evidence
against the legislature's conclusion.' "92 This rationale can be criti-
cized, however, because almost any rebuttal proffered by defen-
dants would serve to establish "conflicts in the evidence," thus
constraining a trial court's conclusion that a rational basis exists.
Vance, in conjunction with Murgia, reaffirms the Court's view
that age does not merit treatment as a suspect category. Vance
also shows that, when generalized presumptions constitute the de-
fense against a claim based on empirical evidence, 93 a legislative
purpose can be validated by inexact and general standards in order
to promote legislative convenience.9"
Vance goes beyond Murgia in one important respect. By
adopting justifications for compulsory retirement which are not
bias-free, the Vance Court accepts the idea that mandatory retire-
ment creates "predictable promotion opportunities and thus
spur[s] morale and stimulate[s] superior performance in the
ranks." 95 Thus, while the Murgia Court addresses the need to "re-
move from police service those whose fitness for uniformed work
presumptively has diminished with age,"9' 8 the Vance Court allows
the removal of persons who, while fully fit, interfere with the ex-
pectations of other workers through their continued presence.
Irrebutable Presumptions
Cases decided after Vance suggest that constitutional chal-
lenges to age discrimination have only limited prospects for success
89. 594 F.2d at 627.
90. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
91. Bradley v. Vance, 436 F. Supp. 134 (D.D.C. 1977).
92. 440 U.S. at 109 (quoting Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v.
Chicago R.I. & Pac. R.R., 393 U.S. 129, 138-39 (1968)).
93. Id. at 110 & n.28. " 'The State is not compelled to verify logical assumptions with
statistical evidence."' Id. (citations omitted).
94. 440 U.S. at 109.
95. Id. at 98.
96. 427 U.S. at 315 (emphasis added).
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as long as a rational basis standard is applied. In Malmed v.
Thornburgh,"s the appellate court reversed the district court and
upheld a Pennsylvania constitutional provision requiring state
judges to retire at age seventy.99 The district court had held that
the state constitutional requirement violated the fourteenth
amendment because it validated the practice in the Pennsylvania
judicial system of relying heavily on the reemployment of retired
judges to do the same work as active judges, but at lower pay and
without fringe benefits. The district court had found this practice
to be but "a thinly veiled scheme for acquiring cheap judicial
labor."100
The district court in Malmed also based its decision on Cleve-
land Board of Education v. LaFleur0 and related Supreme Court
decisions 10 2 that are grounded in the doctrine of irrebutable pre-
sumption of incompetency. The district court found that the
state's presumption that persons beyond age seventy are incompe-
tent to serve as judges was rebutted by the state's extensive reem-
ployment of senior judges. "[T]he Commonwealth itself places lit-
tle credence in the validity of the presumption created by its
mandatory retirement rule.... [I]t is wholly unnecessary to
trample on the rights of all who reach a given age merely in order
97. See note 92 supra.
98. 621 F.2d 565 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 361 (1980).
99. Unlike previous state judge cases, see, e.g., Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906 (1979); Rubino v. Ghezzi, 512 F.2d 431 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 891 (1975), the plaintiffs in Maimed had prevailed in district court on the
unique factual circumstances of the case.
100. 478 F. Supp. 998, 1015 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
101. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
102. E.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (due process clause prohibits Connecti-
cut from denying a student the opportunity to present evidence that he is a bona fide resi-
dent entitled to in-state tuition rates; Court rejected the state's use of an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of nonresidence against students attempting to gain Connecticut residency
status); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (due process clause prohibits Illinois from
automatically declaring children of unmarried fathers, upon the death of the mother, state
wards and placing them in guardianships without a hearing concerning father's parental
fitness). In each of these cases, the state made an irrebuttable presumption that neglected
the due process rights of persons affected by the statutes when reasonable alternate means
of making determinations were available. The underlying validity of the challenged rules or
statutes was not at issue, but rather the lack of procedural safeguards involved in applying
those statutes. In LaFleur, for example, mandatory maternity leave for classroom teachers
after six months was rejected as arbitrary because the presumption of physical incompe-
tency on which it was based was applied without considering the easily ascertainable capaci-
ties and abilities of each individual.
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to weed out the few who are no longer fit."10
The Third Circuit in Malmed reversed the lower court on sev-
eral grounds. First, the court subjected the irrebuttable presump-
tion doctrine, a principle of substantive due process, to the rational
basis test.10 Second, it put forth four rational purposes underlying
the constitutionality of the mandatory retirement provision: (1) re-
ducing court congestion; (2) eliminating the need to remove unfit
judges selectively; (3) avoiding the harm done by unfit senior
judges; and (4) conforming to professional association standards
and current trends.105 The court of appeals ruled that the district
court erred in ignoring the first three rationales and in reaching a
contrary interpretation of the fourth.10 The Malmed court's inter-
pretation of the irrebUttable presumption of incompetency doc-
trine as requiring a rational basis treatment eliminates the conflict
between the rational basis standard of equal protection and the
irrebuttable presumption analysis of - due process, at least in cases
of age discrimination in employment. As interpreted by the Third
Circuit in Malmed, "the [irrebuttable presumption] doctrine is but
another way of stating that if a plaintiff demonstrates that the in-
fereice is not 'rationally related' to a legitimate legislative classifi-
cation, the inference will not pass constitutional muster. 1 07 Under
a traditional equal protection analysis, however, the issue of ir-
rebuttable presumption of incompetence would not arise, for the
plaintiff in such a case would be unable to demonstrate the impact
of the challenged practice.1 08 Once the concept of compulsory re-
tirement as furthering legitimate government interests is accepted
103. 478 F. Supp. 998, 1009 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
104. 621 F.2d 565, 570-71, 575 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 361 (1980).
105. , Id. at 572.
106. Id. at 571-73. The perspective on the purpose and impact of the Pennsylvania
provision varies. While the district court saw the mandatory retirement and reemployment
of senior judges as exploitation, the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention saw it as "sub-
stantiilly increas[ing] judicial manpower by bringing in younger judges while retaining the
part-time services of willing and able retired judges ... [and as] reducing court congestion
..... " Id. at 572. Few would challenge the convention's view of the validity of the state
interest in reducing court congestion. Nothing, however, prevented the Convention from cal-
culating the number of jurists necessary to reduce court congestion, in terms of average
productivity per judge and the current active roster of jurists. Continued imbalances be-
tween the number of judges and cases on the docket, offset in large part by the part-time,
post-retirement use of senior judges, should raise an inference of equal protection violations
of a willful rather than inadvertent character. By focusing on the procedural rather than the
substantive aspects of review, however, the Third Circuit avoided this inquiry in Malmed.
107. Id. at 573-74.
108. Slate v. Noll, 474 F. Supp. 882 (W.D. Wis. 1979), aff'd, 444 U.S. 1007 (1980).
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as valid under a rational basis standard, a statute imposing
manditory retirement at age thirty-five could be just as valid as at
age sixty-five, and "neither would be vulnerable to constitutional
challenge." 109
The distinction underlying the conflict between the rational
basis test and the irrebuttable presumption analysis may be ap-
plied to ADEA situations. The irrebuttable presumption doctrine
forbids arbitrary treatment of persons who have a common charac-
teristic. This prohibition on arbitrary treatment may take two
forms. First, it may permit all persons to remain in their occupa-
tions. This is because "[i]n practical application, the system bears
no rational relationship to the state's purpose of removing unfit
[persons]." 110 Second, it may permit the state to determine treat-
ment on an individual basis. In both situations, the court may con-
sider evidence addressing the extent to which the performance of
individuals of a large subgroup varies from group norms.
In contrast, applying the rational basis test to an ADEA situa-
tion would lead a court to accept group norms as rational without
an inquiry into the empirical foundation of the classifications. In
effect, the irrebuttable presumption is conceded without question-
ing the illegality of the practice if the purpose of the classification
is deemed rational.
Application of one or the other method of analysis of age
classifications developed under the equal protection and irrebut-
table presumption doctrines could have a significant impact in
ADEA cases. The issue does not seem to arise with respect to the
RFOA defense. Because the Department of Labor's regulations ex-
pressly require that any complaints be "determined on an individ-
ual, case by case basis," 1 creation of a class exemption would vio-
late the statute. The Department of Labor has interpreted the
BFOQ defense, however, as allowing the use of group characteris-
tics in setting age requirements.' A narrow construction of this
statutory defense is analogous to an equal protection analysis
based on the rational basis standard. In an ADEA case, the use of
group characteristics to determine age limits generally would be
upheld. In contrast, a broad reading of the statute's purpose and
109. Id. at 886.
110. Malmed v. Thornburgh, 478 F. Supp. 998, 1015 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd, 621 F.2d
565 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 361 (1980).
111. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103 (1980).
112. Id. § 860.102.
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function would be analogous to analysis under the strict irrebut-
table presumption criterion for due process. Nonindividualized or
group distinctions thus would be precluded.
Conclusion
Employment decisions should be based on the qualifications of
individual workers without regard to group behavior or to charac-
teristics extraneous to job performance. When group performance
will be used to measure the ability of each individual within the
group, the group treatment must first be justified by empirical evi-
dence. Otherwise, the effects of age discrimination in employment
will not be fully mitigated through the legal process because the
court will run the risk of failing both to reflect the remedial char-
acter of the law and to focus on the distinction between individual
and group standards.
Judicial interpretation of the section 4(f)(1) BFOQ exemption
is critical to the effectiveness of the ADEA, 113 because employers
have demonstrated their preference for fixed age limits over an in-
dividual determination of the employee's ability to do the job.
Fixed age limits based on group performance standards must be
closely tested, because such limits ignore the wide range of individ-
ual work capacity across age groups.
The standard of review for age discrimination claims raised
under the fifth and fourteenth amendments is the crux of the con-
stitutional litigation involving age discrimination. Unlike sex dis-
crimination claims, which have provoked a degree of enhanced ju-
dicial scrutiny, claims of age discrimination are reviewed under the
less strict rational basis test. The unique character of age discrimi-
nation that might arguably entitle it to stricter scrutiny has gone
largely unacknowledged. 114
The effect of the Supreme Court's reliance on the rational ba-
sis standard in age discrimination cases is the validation of almost
any statutorily determined retirement age. ADEA plaintiffs thus
are deprived in practice of the dual statutory and constitutional
protection that covers victims of race and some types of sex dis-
113. The legislative history of the 1978 Amendments should aid judicial interpretation
in this regard, although no reported cases dealing with the BFOQ exemption have referred
to the congressional record. See note 5 supra.
114. But see Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Massa-
chusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 32
crimination. Furthermore, the failure to accord age equal standing
with other suspect classifications115 causes the ADEA to be less
protective than it could be in conjunction with constitutionally en-
forced prohibitions of arbitrary age limits.
115. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Oyama v. Califor-
nia, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
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